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Labour Market Status and Migration Dynamics
Abstract
In this empirical paper we assess how labour market transitions and out- and repeat migration of
immigrants are interrelated. We estimate a multi-state multiple spell competing risks model with
four states: employed, unemployed receiving benefits, out-of-the-labour market (no benefits) and
abroad. We discuss one-step ahead transitions from all four states and the transition probability,
including all intermediate transitions, from employment. Based on the estimated parameters we
simulate the labour-migration dynamics for a synthetic cohort to derive relevant economic indica-
tors, e.g. the probability of experiencing an unemployment spell.
For the analysis we use data on recent labour immigrants to The Netherlands, which implies
that all migrants are (self)-employed at the time of arrival. We find that many migrants leave the
country after a period of no-income. Employment characteristics and the country of origin play an
important role in explaining the dynamics. The microsimulations of synthetic cohorts reveal that
many migrants experience unemployment spells, but ten years after arrival only a few are unem-
ployed. They also indicate that the Credit Crunch will not only increase the unemployment among
migrants but also departure from the country. An increase in the number of migrants from the EU
accession countries will lead to more dynamics. We do not expect that the recent simplification of
the entry of high income migrants will have a lasting effect, as many of those migrants leave fast.
JEL classification: F22, J61, C41.
Key words: migration dynamics; labour market transitions; competing risks; immigrant assimi-
lation;
1 Introduction
Many European countries see immigration as a potential solution to the social security crisis induced
by an aging population, rising health costs and low fertility rates. Immigration of young workers slows
down the aging of the population. However, immigrants can become a financial burden on the host
country if they get unemployed fast and draw on the social insurance systems, see ?). They could
potentially make an important contribution to the social security system of the host country. Whether
immigrants become a burden depends on their labour market status and how this changes over time.
In principle, only working immigrants contribute financially to the host country. Unemployed migrants
draw on the social security system of the host country. However, many migrants have not gained any
right on social security benefits and these non-participating migrants therefore neither contribute nor
draw on the host country economy.
Whether immigrants become a burden also depends on their migration dynamics in relation to their
labour market status. If out-migration is selective on the most economically successful immigrants,
the host country looses potential contributors. But, if out-migration is selective on unemployed or
out-of-the labour market immigrants, the host country gains from such migration, see ?). The story
does not end with out-migration as a small, but significant, percentage of the out-migrated immigrants
returns to the host (6% within five years in The Netherlands, see Bijwaard (2010)). Some return-out-
migrants still have the right to receive social security benefits. From a host country perspective it is
preferred that the employed migrants, or at least those who do not place a financial burden on the
national social security system, return to the host and the others remain abroad. This leads to a
perpetual tale of intercorrelated labour market behaviour and migration dynamics.
Much of the theoretical and empirical literature on the economics of migration views migrations as
permanent. This is a convenient assumption and often facilitates the analysis of immigrant behaviour
and the impact of migration on the host country. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982) already argued that
many migrations are temporary rather than permanent. For labour migrants migration dynamics are
intertwined with their labour market behaviour, as loosing their job may induce them to search for
another job in another country. To gain insight in the migration dynamics of labour migrants, it is,
therefore, imperative to include their dynamic behaviour on the host country’s labour market.
Some studies have analyzed the labour dynamics of immigrants. For example, Chiswick et al.
(1997) find that for the US that immigrants had some initial difficulty finding work, but their employ-
ment and unemployment rates quickly attained levels comparable to those of natives. Uhlendorff and
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Zimmermann (2006) study the German case and find that immigrants stay unemployed longer than
natives. There is also some empirical evidence that an increasing number of immigrants are beneficia-
ries of welfare programs. Borjas and Hilton (1996) find that in the US the immigrant-native difference
in the probability of receiving benefits is small. Hansen and Lofstrom (2003) find for Sweden that
immigrants use welfare to a greater extend than natives. Hansen and Lofstrom (2009) analysed the
dynamics across the labour market states of an immigrant. They find that (refugee) immigrants dis-
play a higher degree of state dependence in welfare. However, to our knowledge, no study has analyzed
labour market dynamics of immigrants in relation to return (and repetitive) migration behaviour.
Bijwaard (2010) has shown that the migration motive influences the migration dynamics of immi-
grants. A unique feature of the data from Statistics Netherlands used for his article is that information
on the motive to migrate is available for recent non-Dutch, non-national, migrants. Here we use a
subset of the data by focussing on labour migrants, immigrants who are reported labour migrants
and who are (self-)employed at their first entry. Explicit focus on labour migrants is unusual in the
literature. In many studies the issue of migration motive is not addressed (e.g. Borjas 1999).
The data further contain information on the timing of migration moves. A difference with Bijwaard
(2010) is that the data now includes, on a monthly basis, the labour market status and income of
the migrants. The timing of both labour market status changes and migration status changes allows
us to construct the labour market behaviour of the migrants together with their migration history.
The duration in each labour market state forms the basis of our analysis. Duration, or event history,
models have been used extensively for demographic analysis, for example in modelling time till birth of
first child, time till marriage or time till death. However, the number of empirical duration analyses of
migration decisions is rather limited and duration analysis of return migration is even more scarce. A
few exceptions are Waldorf and Esparza (1991), Detang-Dessendre and Molho (1999), Longva (2001)
and Constant and Zimmermann (2003). Most migration data lack information on the exact timing of
the migration moves and only reveal whether the migrant is still in the country at the interview date.
Bijwaard (2010) estimated a mover-stayer duration model, which allows for both permanent and
temporary immigrants, based on demographic data of immigrants to the Netherlands. He showed that
the migration dynamics of these immigrants is substantial and that these dynamics heavily depend on
the migration motive and the country of origin. In this article we focus on labour migrants and include
data on social-economic variables of these migrants. Another difference is that we also consider the
dynamic behaviour of the immigrants on the host country labour market.
We consider three labour market states, employment (including self-employment), receiving ben-
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efits (mainly unemployment benefits) and no-income in the host (or non-participating). We view the
migrant behaviour as a semi-Markov process with individuals moving among the three labour states
and abroad. We model the transition from each state as a competing risk duration model. For esti-
mation we assume that the transition intensities for each competing risk are mutually independent.
A problem with competing risks models is the interpretation of the parameters, because a particular
covariate may appear in several intensities. Therefore, the results of the models are reported in terms
of marginal effects on the exit probability. The marginal effect have a simple closed form solution be-
cause we use competing risks models with piecewise constant baseline hazards and discrete unobserved
heterogeneity, see Kyyra¨ (2009).
A labour migrant may, as we observe in our data, first become non-participating before leaving
the country. However, the exit probability only looks one step ahead and, therefore, only gives an
incomplete picture of the dynamic behaviour of the immigrants. In order to look further ahead we
calculate the transition probabilities, that take all the intermediate transitions into account, from
employment. Again we report the marginal effects of the observed migrant characteristics on the
transition probability.
Still a great deal of information on the behaviour of the immigrants is hidden when we report the
transition probabilities. Important indicators of economic assimilation, as the number of unemploy-
ment spells or the length of unemployment spells cannot analytically be derived from the transition
probabilities. However, based on the estimated parameters of the combined multistate multiple spell
competing risk models we can simulate a synthetic cohort of migrants that provide us with many
indicators that pertain to the length and number of spells in a particular state. Additionally, such
microsimulation can, by changing the start population, provide us results for different scenario’s con-
cerning future migrant behaviour. We consider three alternative scenario’s. The first scenario assumes
an increase in the national unemployment rate from 3.1% to 6%, as is currently encountered due to
the Credit Crunch. The second scenario assumes that the number of immigrants from the EU ac-
cession countries, the countries that joined the EU in 2004, quadruples. This has happened in The
Netherlands from 2002 to 2007. The final scenario assumes an increase in the inflow of high income
(> e 5000 per month) with 50%. This could be the effect of a recently implemented Dutch policy that
simplifies entry of these migrants.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section we shortly review the relevant economic
theory on (return) migration and on labour market performance of immigrants. In Section 3 we discuss
estimation and inference in a multi-state multiple spell competing risks model. In Section 4 we present
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the data and discuss the recent migrant history to the Netherlands. Section 5 gives the empirical results
on the one-step ahead and transition probabilities. Section 6 provides the microsimulation of the base
and alternative scenario’s. Section 7 summarizes the results and states our conclusion.
2 Conceptual framework
Much of the economic research considers migration as permanent (see a.o. Chiswick 1978, Massey
et al. 1993 and Borjas 1999). Nevertheless, the level of return migration has been high both in the
US and in Europe. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982) report that of 1971 cohort of immigrants to the US,
almost fifty percent returned by 1979. Dustmann (1995) has demonstrated the relevance of return
migration in the European context. In The Netherlands recent migrants also show a high return rate,
see Bijwaard (2010). The return rates greatly differ by migration motive, with students and labour
migrants having the fastest departure rate.
An important contribution to the theoretical explanations of return emigration of immigrants is
provided by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996). They attribute return migration to an optimal residential
local plan over the life cycle where immigrants return to source countries due to the realization of a
savings goal or due to erroneous information about economic opportunities in the host country. Other
theories attribute return migration to region-specific preferences (Hill 1987; Dustmann and Weiss
2007), higher purchasing power of host currency in source countries (Dustmann and Weiss 2007) or to
greater returns for human capital acquired in the host country (Borjas and Bratsberg 1996; Dustmann
and Weiss 2007). Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) also show that the selection of emigrants from a
particular country reinforces the initial selection of immigrants to that country. Return migration
may also be the result of unexpected events either information. It should also be noted that the
boundary between between temporary and permanent migrants is not impermeable, see ?).
Repeated migration occurs more often when we consider internal migration within a particular
country. From the literature on internal migration we know that migration history has a systematic
effect upon migration behaviour. For example, DaVanzo (1983) finds that those who have moved
before are much more likely to move again (see also Constant and Zimmermann (2003)). Bailey
(1993) shows that repeated migration of young adults within the US is a selective process, as it makes
them less responsive to national unemployment conditions than first time migrants. He also finds that
the timing of unemployment within the sojourn has a critical influence upon migration behaviour.
For international migration the relation between unemployment experience and migration behaviour
is more complex.
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The analysis of repeated migration should not be separated from the labour market performance
of the migrants in the host country. In the economic literature on migrant performance the focus
has mainly been on the earnings of immigrants (Chiswick 1978, Borjas 1999). Much of this literature
tends to emphasize the importance of earnings convergence, i.e. the effect of the time since arrival
on the earnings difference with native workers. A major flaw of this literature is that it ignores the
endogeneity of return migration, with Constant and Massey (2003) as one of the exceptions. Another
issue is that earnings of the migrants only tell a part of the performance tale of the labour market
outcomes. The incidence of unemployment among immigrants also plays an important role. For the
analysis of this labour market outcome it is also important to account for selective out-migration.
For policy makers it is of particular interest to know whether unemployment of a migrant induces
out-migration or to stay longer and drawing on the host country social security system.
A few studies have analysed the transitions migrants make on the labour market. Uhlendorff and
Zimmermann (2006) investigate the unemployment experiences of migrants in Germany. They take the
temporal dependence of unemployment and employment spells into account. Borjas and Hilton (1996)
find that in the US the immigrant-native difference in the probability of receiving benefits is small.
Hansen and Lofstrom (2009) analysed the dynamics across the labour market states of an immigrant
with an emphasize on welfare. However, they ignore possible selective out-migration. However, no
study has taken the possible selective out-migration into account. ?) shows that unemployment has
a profound effect on the timing of out-migration, but he ignores to take the route to unemployment
into account. The contribution of this article is that we take an integrated view on labour market
status and migration dynamics. By modeling the timing of both labour market changes and migration
moves together we take the whole labour market history and the migration dynamics into account. In
this article we focus on labour migrants only.
Information on the host country’s labour market is crucial for success. The information problem
for migrants may be bigger the further, both in distance and in culture, the host and source are
apart. Furthermore migrants from further away could possess less host country specific human capital
upon arrival. There is a considerable body of evidence that distance matters in deterring migration,
see Long et al. (1988). The opportunity cost of remaining in the host are lower for countries close
by. For example, Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) find that immigrants to the US tend to return to
rich and to countries close to the US. Ethnicity is also important if immigrants of a certain ethnic
group systematically perceive a lower return than expected. For immigrants belonging to such groups
the re-migrate rate is higher. On the other hand, human capital accumulation in the host may be
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more in demand in countries similar to the host. For example, for the Netherlands the demand of
high-skilled workers in other EU-countries or in the US is relevant for the re-migrate rate of these
workers. This may lead to higher return- and re-immigration rates for immigrants from countries
close to the Netherlands. Another issue is that immigrants from some countries may find it easier to
migrate than other. An example is that citizens of EU-countries are formally allowed to migrate to
and to work in other EU-countries. Following this argument EU-citizens should have a higher return
and re-immigration rate than none EU-citizens.
Most labour migrants work for a company, while some migrants start their own business. These
self-employed migrants need to invest more in the new country to be successful. This may lead to a
higher attachment to the new labour market. It is therefore important to distinguish between self-
employed and company-employed migrants. Different sectors of the economy attract different types of
migrants. We expect that migrants working in a sector in which temporary contracts are very common
have less attachment to the new labour market. Those migrants may leave fast. The labour market
behaviour in each sector may also differ, as employment in some sectors, notably temporary services
and agriculture, is less stable.
In the literature opposing theories exist on the impact of the income level of migrants in the host
country on their return propensity, see Constant and Massey (2003). Neoclassical Economics (NE)
view return migration as a cost-benefit decision, maximizing expected lifetime income. According
to this view return migrants are ”failures” and low income migrants are more prone to return. The
alternative New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM, ?) theory views migration as a response
to market failures at home. According to this theory, people seek to migrate abroad temporarily
to accumulate savings. They view migrants as target earners who return home after their target
is reached. Thus, NELM views return migrants not as failures, but as ”successes”, and high income
migrants would return faster. Many recent migrants have not yet gained any right on security benefits,
because their duration of stay is too short. These migrants could be without income when they loose
their job. The two theories do not exclude migrants that are temporary without income (from the
host) remain in the host. Under NE the migrant may expect to return back to work and the period
of income is just a friction. Under NELM the migrant remains because the target has not yet been
reached.
Another important issue is whether the timing of arrival has a permanent effect on the labour
market status of immigrants. Does arriving in the host country in a period of high unemployment, in
which prospects for good jobs for new immigrants are scarce, place the immigrant in an unfavourable
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long-term employment situation? A related question is whether the selectivity of labour immigrants,
controlling for personal and job characteristics and country of origin, varies over the business cycle.
Are immigrants who arrive in a recession more favourably selected, perhaps because only the most
able migrate when jobs are scarce? The scarring effect can be measured by including the analysis a
variable for the unemployment rate in the economy the moment the immigrant arrives in the the host
country.
3 A competing risks model
For both the labour market and the migration dynamics the timing of the transitions and the time
between transitions is crucial. In a duration model the timing of a particular event (or recurrent
event) is modeled. Another reason to apply duration models is that many relevant characteristics,
like for example income and marital status, of the migrant may change over time. In duration models
it is straightforward to incorporate such time-varying variables. We view the migrant behaviour as a
semi-Markov process with individuals moving between four states. The four states identified in this
paper are:
1. Employed in the host country;
2. Unemployed and receiving benefits in the host country;
3. Out of the labour market (and not receiving benefits= non-participating) in the host country;
4. Living abroad.
These states are mutually exclusive and exhaust all possible destinations. A migrant may leave
a state j = 1, . . . , 4 for any of the other destination states, i.e. for j = 1 the destination states are
k = 2, 3, 4, for j = 2 k = 1, 3, 4 etc.
For simplicity we assume that all spells are independent of each other. We use a competing risks
model hazard model for each origin-destination pair. Define the random variables Tjk that describe
the time since entry in j for a transition from j to k. We assume a mixed proportional hazard model
for which the intensity for the transition from j to k is:
λjk(t|Xjk(t), Vjk) = λ0jk(t) exp
(
β′jkXjk(t) + Vjk
)
(1)
where Xjk(t) = {Xjk(s)|0 ≤ s ≤ t} is the sample path of the observed characteristics up to time t,
which is, without loss of generality, assumed to be left continuous. The unobserved heterogeneity Vjk
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also enters the intensity multiplicatively. We assume that the path of the observed characteristics is
independent of the unobserved heterogeneity. The positive function λ0jk(t) is the baseline intensity
and we assume that it is piecewise constant on H intervals1, i.e. λ0jk(t) =
∑H
h=1 e
αjkhIh(t) with
Ih(t) = I(th−1 ≤ t < th) and t0 = 0, tH = ∞. Any duration dependence can be approximated
arbitrarily closely by increasing the number of intervals. The integrated intensity for a transition from
j to k at duration t is (conditional on V )
Λjk(t|Xjk(t), Vjk) =
H∑
h=1
eαjkh+βjkXh+Vjk
(
th − th−1
)
Jh(t) +
H∑
h=1
eαjkh+βjkXh+Vjk
(
t− th−1
)
Ih(t) (2)
with Jh(t) = I(t > th−1) and we assume that the change in the time-varying components of X only
occur at the discrete time and that the H intervals also capture these changes. Thus xh is the value
of x in interval [th−1, th).
For each origin state only the smallest of Tjk durations T˜j = mink Tjk and the corresponding actual
transition destination are observed. The other durations are censored, in the sense that all is known
that their realisations exceed T˜j . Suppose for individual i we observe Mijk j to k transition spells, at
sojourn times t1, . . . , tM , then the likelihood for these Mijk transitions is:
Ljk =
∫ Mijk∏
m=1
λjk(tm|Xjk(tm), Vjk)
δmjk exp
(
−
∑
g 6=j
Λjg(tm|Xjg(tm), Vjg)
)
dHjk(Vjk) (3)
where δmjk = 1 for a j to k transition and 0 otherwise, Λjk(tm|Xjk(tm), Vjk) =
∫ tm
0 λjk(s|Xjk(s), Vjk) ds,
the integrated intensity. Hjk(Vjk) is the distribution function of the unobserved heterogeneity, which
we assume to be a discrete distribution with two points of support, (v1jk, v2jk) and Pr(Vjk = v1jk) =
pjk.
2
For each origin destination pair the parameters are estimated separately. In other words, we
assume that the transition intensities for each competing risk are mutually independent. This implies
that the spell specific unobserved heterogeneity (Vjk) are uncorrelated across the origin-destination
pairs.
1It is not necessary that each baseline intensity changes at the same durations. Here H is the total number of
intervals considered. If for the transition from j to k the baseline intensity remains the same in Ih(t) and Ih+1(t) we
have αjkh = αjkh+1.
2We estimate
(
exp(v1jk), exp(v2jk)
)
and qjk with pjk = e
qjk/(1 + eqjk ) and leave out the constant in the baseline
intensity.
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3.1 Inference in competing risks models
The interpretation of the coefficients in a competing risks model requires caution.3 A particular
covariate, say xl, can appear in several intensities. In such a case the vectors βljk convey little
information about the effect of the covariate on the probability to exit from origin j to destination k.
The reason is that the exit probability not only depends on the intensity of making a transition to k
but also on the transition intensities to all other states.
The issue of difficult interpretation of covariate effects also arises in many other non-linear models,
like the multinomial logit and probit models (see a.o. Cameron and Trivedi (2005), chapter 15). The
results of such models are, therefore, usually reported in terms of the marginal effects on the probability
of interest. Thomas (1996) and Kyyra¨ (2009) argue that a similar practice is useful in the context
of competing risks models. Although the marginal effects eliminate much of the confusing about
the interpretation of the results form competing risks models, they have rarely been computed. A
drawback is that in general the marginal effects have no analytical solution, making their computation
demanding and statistical inference difficult. Kyyra¨ (2009) shows that simple closed form solutions
exist for the competing risks models with piecewise constant baseline hazards and discrete unobserved
heterogeneity, exactly the model formulation we assume.
First, we discuss the total survival and the cumulative incidence function. Together they provide
the distribution over the states at a particular sojourn time from each origin state. The total survival
function from origin j is
Sj(t|Xjk(t)) = Pr
(
T˜j ≥ t
)
=
∏
l 6=j
∫
exp
(
−Λjl
(
t|Xjl(t), Vjk
))
dHjl(Vjl) (4)
The total survival gives the probability of starting in origin j and stay there till for at least a duration
t. For instance, the total survival for an employed migrant gives the probability to remain employed
up to a given time. The cumulative incidence function is the probability of making a transition from
j to k before duration t. Conditional on unobserved heterogeneity the cumulative incidence can be
3Note that in a standard mixed proportional hazard (MPH) model the interpretation of the coefficients is also not
so clear. In a MPH model the regression coefficient of covariate xl is only defined conditional on the unobserved
heterogeneity.
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expressed as
Fjk(t|Xjk(t), Vjk) = Pr
(
T˜j ≤ t,destination k
)
=
∫ t
0
λjk(s|Xjk(s), Vjk)Sj(s|Xjk(s), Vjk) ds
=
H∑
h=1
pihjk(X|Vjk)
[
S
(
th−1|Xjl(t), Vjk
)
− S
(
th|Xjl(t), Vjk
)]
Jh(t) (5)
+
H∑
h=1
pihjk(X|Vjk)
[
S
(
th−1|Xjl(t), Vjk
)
− S
(
t|Xjl(t), Vjk
)]
Ih(t)
where pihjk(X|Vjk) denotes the probability of exit from j to k in interval [th−1, th) conditional on exiting
and S(th−1|·)−S(th|·) is the probability of exiting j during the interval [th−1, th). Integrating out the
discrete unobserved heterogeneity we obtain
Fjk(t|Xjk(t)) =
∑
q
Pr(Vj = V
q
j )Fjk(t|Xjk(t), V
q
j ) (6)
with Vj = {Vjk, k 6= j} and the sum is over all possible realizations of Vj (eight in our application
with a 2-point discrete unobserved heterogeneity distribution and three exit states). Thus, the cu-
mulative incidence function from employment gives the probability to leave employment either to
unemployment, to non-participation or to abroad before a given time spent in employment. Note that
∑
k 6=j Fjk(t|·) = 1− Sj(t|·).
The probability of ever exiting from j to k, pijk(x), is the limit of the cumulative incidence func-
tion. It is easy to derive that with discrete unobserved heterogeneity and piecewise constant baseline
intensities we have
pijk(x) =
∑
q
Pr(Vj = V
q
j )
exp(αjkH + βjkXH + V
q
jk)∑K
l=1 exp(αjlH + βjlXH + V
q
jl)
(7)
Kyyra¨ (2009) derives the marginal effects of Sj(t|·), Fjk(t|·) and pijk(·) of a variable xl. In principle
many marginal effects can be defined, depending on the values of the covariates (or path for time-
varying covariates). The marginal effects of the first two functions also depend on the duration.
We choose only to report the marginal effects of the exit probability, which does not depend on the
duration. It is common to define the marginal effects w.r.t. the average individual, but marginal
effects w.r.t. the reference individual are closer to ordinary coefficient interpretation. In our analysis
most of the covariates are binary and the marginal effect of a covariate is simply ∆pijk(xl) = pijk(t|xl =
1)− pijk(t|0).
3.2 Transition probabilities
The total survival, cumulative incidence function and exit probability only give an incomplete picture
of the dynamics of the migrants, as they just look one event ahead. In order to look further ahead,
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we need to take all the transitions into account. An employed migrant may, as we observe in our
data, first become non-participating before he leaves the country. Another possible route to leave the
country is through unemployment and non-participation, in either way. It is even possible that the
migrant, after a period of unemployment returns to work and then leaves the country. The transition
probability takes all the possible transitions into account. Dabrowska et al. (1994) describe how we
can derive these transition probabilities for the semi-Markov model we use.
The transition probability from state j to state k after a duration t (time since the migrant entered
the host for the first time) is formed by adding all possible intermediate transitions that start in j
and end in k at time t. First consider the migrants who do not make a transition in (0, t), thus
j = k. Those individuals remain in j till t, say the employed migrants who remain working. The
probability that the employed remain working is equal to the total survival of the employed, Sj(t).
Next we have the migrants who make one transition within a period t since they entered the country,
say from employment to non-participation, and then remain in this state till the end of the period.
The probability that a transition from j to k before t occurs and the migrants then remain in k is
equal to ∫ t
0
fjk(u|·) · Sk(t− u) du
with fjk(t) = ∂Fjk(t)/∂t, the ‘subdistribution density’. Some migrants may after first first making a
transition from employment to non-participation end abroad. The probability to make a transition
from j to k within a period t with one intermediate initial transition is
F
(2)
jk (t|·) =
∫ t
0
4∑
m=1
Fjm(u|·) · fmk(t− u|·) du
with the cumulative incidence from j to j, Fjj(t|·) = 0. Then, the probability that a migrant who
made these two transitions and who remains in state k till t is
∫ t
0
f
(2)
jk (u|·)Sk(t− u) du,
with f
(2)
jk (u|·) = ∂F
(2)
jk (t)/∂t. This reasoning is repeated for any number of intermediate transitions
from state j to state k Thus, the transition probability, that is the probability to be in k starting in
j after a duration t is
Pjk(t|·) = Sj(t|·) · I(j = k) +
∑
p≥1
∫ t
0
f
(p)
jk (u|·)Sk(t− u) du (8)
where f
(p)
jk (t) = ∂F
(p)
jk (t)/∂t and
F
(p)
jk (t|·) =
∫ t
0
4∑
m=1
F
(p−1)
jm (u|·) · fmk(t− u|·) du
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In our data we follow labour immigrants to The Netherlands who are employed at entry. We follow
the labour market and migration dynamics of these labour migrants. Thus, we are only interested in
the transition probability from employment, P1k(t|·). After estimating all the competing risks models
for all the possible transitions we will derive the path of these transition probabilities for the reference
individual and discuss the impact of observed characteristics on these probabilities.
Again no direct relation between the coefficients of the competing risks models and the effect of the
covariates on the transition probability exists. We therefore calculate the (discrete) marginal effects
of the migrant characteristics on these transition probabilities, with the reference migrant.
4 Data on immigrants to The Netherlands
In the early 1960s The Netherlands changed from an emigrant to an immigrant country. Immigration
follows a European sequence of post World War II and post-colonial immigration, unskilled manpower
recruitment and the arrival of refugees. The first period is characterized by the de-colonization of
Indonesia in 1949, as a consequence many Indonesian people came to The Netherlands. In the second
period, starting in the beginning of the 1960s, a large flow of ‘guestworkers’, mainly Turks and Moroc-
cans arrived. The Dutch government regulated the recruitment practices by bilateral agreements with
the main countries. The total inflow of immigrants reached 235,000 in 1970s. The recruitment policy
stopped during the first oil crisis. However, the immigration from the recruitment countries continued
as a follow-up migration, first in the form of family reunification and later also family formation. In
this period the independence of Surinam also caused large immigration. Starting in the 1980s, immi-
gration is characterized by the family reunification/formation of ‘guestworkers’. Additionally, the flow
of political refugees, asylum seekers has increased dramatically. In the political discourse it is often
forgotten that the number of labour immigrants from neighbouring countries and other EU countries
has always been substantial. In the last twenty years the majority of labour immigrants come from
these countries or from other western countries. The forming of the European Union and the EU
treaty of 1993 that allows free movement of people within the union has facilitated the migration
within the EU. In 2004 the EU was enlarged with 10 more countries.4 However, only in May 2007
people from these new EU countries received full access to the Dutch labour market. The Dutch
government recognized in 2004, in light of the Lisbon agreement, the need for high skilled migrants to
sustain further economic growth. This ‘knowledge regulation’ simplifies entry into The Netherlands
4The enlargement in 2007 with 5 more countries is beyond the observation period of our database.
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for migrants who will earn more than e 47 thousand a year.5
The annual emigration from The Netherlands was rather stable between the late 50s till the late
80s. In those years around 60 thousand people left the country each year. In the early 50s emigration
peaked at 80 thousand people. This was mainly due to active emigration policies of the Dutch
government. These active emigration policies were inverted into an active immigration policy in the
60s when a shortage of labour occurred. In the 90s and early this century emigration increased fast,
to reach a new peak at 132 thousand emigrants. However, the composition of the recent emigrants
differs substantially from the composition of the emigrants in the 50s and 60s. In the latter period the
emigrants were almost entirely native Dutch, while two-thirds of the recent emigrants are non-native,
see Nicolaas (2006). Recent research have shown that many migrants leave fast, within five years 40%
of the recent migrants have left the country, and that migration experience accelerates this process
(Zorlu et al. (2004), van Gaalen et al. (2008) and Bijwaard (2010)).
We have data on recent immigration and emigration to and from The Netherlands (1999-2005).
All immigration by non-Dutch citizens, immigrants who do not hold the Dutch nationality, who
legally entered The Netherlands is registered in the Central Register Foreigners (Centraal Register
Vreemdelingen, CRV), using information from the Immigration Police (Vreemdelingen Politie) and
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Immigratie- en Naturalisatie Dienst, IND).6 For all these
immigrants without the Dutch nationality we know when their migration move(s) took place and what
their migration motive was to enter the Netherlands. For people with a nationality that implies a visa
to enter The Netherlands, their migration motive can be directly derived from their legal entry status.
People with other, Western nationalities, fill in their migration motive at their mandatory registration
at their municipality of residence. With these data we can identify important groups of immigrants
to the Netherlands. Statistics Netherlands make the distinction between labour-migrants, family
reunification migrants, family-formation migrants, student immigrants, asylum seekers (and refugees),
and immigrants for other reasons (including a.o. joining with labor migrant, medical treatment and
Au Pair). Of course, the official migration motive does not always match with the true intention of the
migrants. Some refugees and family migrants have, partially, economic motives to enter the country.
Still the labour participation of these migrants is substantially lower than for labour migrants, see
Sprangers et al. (2004). We focus on migrants with a labour motive and who are employed in The
5See Zorlu and Hartog (2002) and Van Ours and Veenman (2005) for a more detailed discussion on the immigration
to The Netherlands.
6The criterion for registration as an immigrant in the Netherlands is a four months time criterion. To be more precise:
every person intending to stay in the Netherlands for at least two thirds of the forthcoming six months, should notify
the local population register immediately after the arrival in the Netherlands.
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Netherlands within three months of their entry.
The CBS, Statistics Netherlands, has linked these data to the Municipal Register of Population
(Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie, GBA) and to their Social Statistical database (SSB). The GBA
data contain basic demographic characteristics of the migrants, such as age, gender, marital status
and country of origin. From the SSB we have information (on a monthly basis) on the labour mar-
ket position, income, industry sector and household situation. The most important income source
determines the labour market position. Based on the income source CBS distinguishes nine labour
market categories: employed, self-employed, unemployment benefits, disability benefits, social security
benefits, other benefits, pensions, students and non-participating (no income). We combine the first
two categories to an employed status. All the other categories except for the last are combined to
the unemployment, receiving benefits, category. Note that many recent non-EU immigrants are not
eligible for most benefits in The Netherlands. They can only draw on these benefits after some years
of employment/residence in the country. Because we are interested in the labour market behaviour
of migrants we restrict our analysis to the (non-Dutch) labour migrants immigrants. We further re-
strict our sample to the immigrants between 18 and 64 years of age. About 23% of all non-Dutch
immigrants in these age brackets are labour migrants. The same data was used by van Gaalen and
Bijwaard (2008) to analyse return migration of this group of migrants. Here we extend the analysis
to include labour market dynamics on the Dutch labour market.
Put Table 1 about here
In Table 1 we present some descriptive statistics for the data and compare the averages with
the averages for the Dutch workforce. Labour migrants are mostly men, even more than the Dutch
workforce. They are more often single and less often married or have children at home. The immigrants
are relatively young. They work more often in services and as temporary workers. The migrants also
work relatively often in education. The table also shows the distribution of the migrants over a selected
group of countries/regions of origin.7 The majority of labour migrants originates from a country in the
European Union, in particular from the neighbouring countries UK, Germany, France and Belgium.
Put Table 2 about here
7EU15/EFTA are countries in the European Union, except for the 2004 new members and except for Belgium,
Germany, UK and France plus the member countries of EFTA: Switzerland, Norway, Iceland. Former Yugoslavia are
Croatia, Serbia & Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia. New EU members are the countries that joined the European
Union in 2004: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and, Slovakia.
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The migrants in our sample show a substantial dynamic behaviour. Of all the migrants that
enter, including those that arrive in December 2003, 48% leaves the country at least once, 24% has
more than one employment spell, 11% has at least one unemployment spell and 40% has at least one
non-participation spell. Table 2 report the observed transitions among the four different states. The
majority of employment spells end in non-participation, while the majority of non-participation spells
end abroad. The majority of the spells abroad are censored, the migrants are still abroad at the end
of the observation period. Close to half of the relatively small number of unemployment spells end
in employment. But a third of the unemployed leave the labour market. Very few migrants leave the
country from unemployment.
Put Figure 1 about here
By definition any labour migrant starts in the employed state at entry. Soon after arrival some
migrants move to the other states. Some may return and some may move on to another state. But the
migrant is always in one of the four states. In Figure 1 we depict the development of the distribution
over the four states for the 1999-entry cohort. The most prominent feature of this development
is that only a few migrants get unemployment benefits. Thus, the financial burden on the Dutch
economy of these migrants is small. Instead, a substantial proportion of the migrants become non-
participating (without receiving benefits), possibly because they do not have gained any benefit rights
in the Netherlands. The proportion of migrants abroad continuously increases. Six years after arrival
more than 50% of the labour migrants have left the country. When we combine this result with the
numbers in Table 2 it seems that non-participation is a temporary status before the migrant leaves
the country.
5 Empirical Findings
For each of the four labour market status separately we estimate competing risks models to the other
destination states. We assume a piecewise constant baseline intensity on eleven intervals (every six
months and beyond five years) and a two-point discrete unobserved heterogeneity. The covariates
included (see Table 3) in the model refer to demographic (gender, age, martial status and age of
children), country of origin, and individual labour market characteristics (monthly income, industry
sector). Labour market history and migration history is also included. For transitions from employ-
ment we include a dummy for previous employment experience. For transitions from unemployment
and from non-participation we include a dummy for previous unemployment and for non-participation
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experience. For all transitions from the Dutch labour market we include a dummy for repeated im-
migration to the Netherlands. For transitions back to the Netherlands we include the labour market
status at departure and a dummy for repeated emigration.
We control for business cycle conditions by including the national unemployment rate, both at the
moment of first entry to the country and the time-varying monthly rate. The unemployment rate at
entry captures the ‘scarring effect’ of migrants, while the running unemployment rate captures the
impact of the business cycle on the transition intensities.
For transition from employment the reference individual is a 30-35 year old single male without chil-
dren from a EU/EFTA-country (except the neighboring countries UK, Belgium, France or Germany)
employed in the trade sector and with a monthly income of e 2000-e 3000. For both the unemployed
and the non-participating the industry sector is dropped from the analysis. A non-participating mi-
grant has, by definition, no income. Thus income is not included in the transition intensities from
non-participation. The reference national unemployment rate is the average registered unemployment
rate in the Netherlands for the period 1999-2005 which was 3.1%.
5.1 One step ahead analyses
We used maximum likelihood estimation to obtain the estimated parameters for all transition intensi-
ties. For the estimation we use the likelihood in (3) with a two-point discrete unobserved heterogeneity
distribution. From the estimated coefficients we first derive the total survival and cumulative inci-
dence rates for the reference migrant from each state, see Figure 2.8 From employment the majority
of transitions is to non-participation. After five years about 40% of the employed labour migrants has
left the labour market and 6% has left the country. The departure from unemployment, depicted in
the upper-right corner of the picture, is very fast. Within two years most unemployed individuals have
left unemployment. A large majority of the unemployed become employed again (70%). However, a
substantial proportion, 20%, leaves the labour market and becomes non-participating. A large pro-
portion of the non-participants leaves the country. Five years after becoming a non-participant about
40% of the migrants has left the country. But, we also find that 45% of them return to work within
five years. Combining the two left–hand side picture we see that departure of labour migrants from
the Netherlands is driven by migrants that first become non-participants and then leave the country.
Put Figure 2 about here
8A full list estimates is available from the author upon request.
16
As discussed in Section 3.1 the interpretation of the coefficients in a competing risks model is not
straightforward, because the probability to exit to a particular state not only depends on the intensity
to leave to this state but also on the intensities to leave to the other states. In Table 4 till Table 7 the
marginal effects on the exit probability, the limit of the cumulative incidence, of selected covariates
are presented. Presenting the marginal effects for all covariates (see Table 3) for all four origin states
would result in many more tables. We choose to report only those variables for which at least one
of the marginal effects is significant (on a 5% level). Note that only a few countries of origin play a
significant role in explaining the differences in exit probabilities.
Put Table 4 till Table 7 about here
The discussion of these marginal effects is included in the discussion of the transition probabilities in
the next Section. One issue hidden in the analysis of the transition probabilities is, however, the impact
of migration and labour market experience on the dynamics. Employed migrants who have been abroad
are very likely to leave the country again, see DaVanzo (1983). A disrupted employment spell increases
the chance to leave to unemployment and the chance of going abroad. Repeated unemployment spells
increases the chance to exit unemployment to employment. However, it decreases the chance to exit
from non-participation to employment or abroad. (Repeated) non-participation experience decreases
the probability to exit from unemployment to employment dramatically, but has less impact on the
exit probability from non-participation. Migrants who leave the country form unemployment or non-
participation have a smaller chance enter the country again in employment. The first enter the country
more often unemployed and the second enter more often without income.
5.2 Transition probabilities
The total survival, cumulative incidence function and exit probability only look one event ahead.
To get the complete picture of the labour market dynamics of migrants we calculate the transition
probability, using the approach mentioned in Section 3.2. The transition probability takes all possible
transitions among the four states into account. Since the migrants are, by definition, all employed
at arrival, we only calculate the transition probability from employment. The transition probability
then provides the distribution of the migrants over the four states as a function of the time since they
first arrived in the Netherlands. Figure 3 depicts this distribution, together with the 95% confidence
intervals, for a reference migrant (see page 16) up to ten years after the first arrival.
Put Figure 3 about here
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The percentage of the migrants that is employed decreases with the time since arrival, but not
as fast as the survival rate in employment in Figure 2. This figure also shows that many migrants
return from non-participation to employment. This inflow increases the employment rate of the
migrants. Departure from the country is much higher than the cumulative incidence from employment
to abroad as depicted in Figure 2. Again this is caused by the transition from non-participation. The
percentage of migrants without income stabilizes after three years at around 10%. We also note that
unemployment among the labour migrants is very low (1.6% after 10 years in the country). Thus,
the financial burden of the labour migrants on the Dutch economy seems very low. However, even if
at one particular point in time the number of unemployed migrants may be low many more migrants
may have been unemployed during their stay. Many migrant are only unemployed for a short period
of time. This is hidden in the transition probability. In the next section we discuss how we can
derive how often and for how long migrants get unemployed (and many more relevant indicators)
using microsimulation.
Five years after arrival 75% of the reference migrants (see page 16) is still employed, 11% is non-
participating, 14% is living abroad and only 1% is unemployed. Again no direct relation between
the coefficients of the competing risks models and the effect on the transition probability exists. We
therefore calculate the (discrete) marginal effects on the transition probability. Table 8, together with
Figure 4 to Figure 6, reports these marginal effects on the transition probability five years after the
first arrival to the Netherlands (only for selected covariates).
Put Table 8 and Figure 4 to Figure 6 about here
First we focus on the personal characteristics of the migrants. Gender is relatively unimportant.
Women have a slightly higher chance to become unemployed and a slightly lower chance to leave the
country (see also Table 4-7 ). Married, cohabiting and divorced migrants have a higher probability to
remain employed (compared to the single, never married, migrant) and a lower probability to leave the
country. For cohabiting and divorced migrants the latter is mainly caused by the exit rates from non-
participation, high to employment and low to another country (see also Table 6). Older migrants have,
just as older natives, a lower chance to remain employed and a higher chance to become unemployed.
They have a higher chance to become unemployed and a lower chance to return from unemployment
back to employment. Children in the household of the migrant lead to slightly higher chance to remain
employed and a lower chance to have no income. For these households a period without income is
hard to endure.
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Self-employed migrants have a higher probability to stay in the country and to remain employed.
Five years after entry 90% is still employed. Self-employment implies a risky investment which in-
creases the ties to the country. It seems that those migrants are rather good in setting up a new
business. The impact of income on the employment probability is U-shaped. Both low and high
income migrants have a lower probability to remain employed. For low income migrants only half of
them is still employed in the Netherlands five years after arrival and about 20% has left the country.
These figures hardly change when we look at longer times sice arrival (see Figure 4 and 6). Low income
migrants also become unemployed and non-participating relatively often. High income migrants leave
the country even faster (30% within 5 years). However, they enter unemployment less often. The
reason for low income migrants to have a low employment probability is mainly because they have low
job security. Some of them leave the country to try their luck elsewhere. For high income migrants
a competitive international labour market exists. So, they leave for another country if they can earn
more there.
The sector the (employed) migrant is working in has a large impact on the dynamics. Many
migrants work in the temporary work sector. They have a limited contract length and therefore they
leave the country fast. Again the route out of the country is very often via non-participation. This
is also the reason that migrants working in the catering industry and agriculture leave the country
faster. The better labour market prospects of the highly educated migrants working in the education
sector is reflected in a lower non-participation rate.
The labour market behaviour of the migrants also depends on the country of origin. We would
expect that migrants from Western countries have stronger ties to the Dutch labour market. Our
estimated marginal effects of the exit probability do not completely support this hypothesis. This
holds for migrants from neighbouring Belgium and Germany, but migrants from the other neighbouring
countries, the UK and France, seems to behave differently. They have worse labour market prospects.
A possible explanation is that people from Belgium share the Dutch language and German is also
closer to Dutch than English and French. Migrants from Japan and North-America leave faster.
Many expatriates working for multinationals come from these countries. These workers often have a
fixed term contracts in one particular country. This is in particular visible for the Japanese labour
migrants as their probability to remain employed is higher the first two years after arrival (see Figure 4).
Migrants from the new EU-countries have good prospects on the Dutch labour market. They are more
often repetitive migrants (see Table 7). The migrants from the old guest-worker countries, Morocco
and Turkey, show different dynamics. Turkish migrants have low attachment to the labour market
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and leave more often, while Moroccan migrants become unemployed more often and leave less often.
Note that nowadays only a small number of the labour migrants arrive from these countries.
The business cycle at the moment of arrival has little effect on the employment rate of migrants.
The unemployment rate during their stay has the expected impact. When the unemployment rate is
high migrants work less, are more often unemployed and leave the country more often.
6 Scenario analyses
The transition probabilities give the probability that a labour migrant is in any of the states after a
given time since the migrant entered the country. They take the full dynamics into account. However,
we loose the information on how an individual reached a certain state. From the total survival and
cumulative incidence functions we could predict the (average) time the migrant has spent in the
intermediate states until he reaches the final state. Still, many relevant indicators of the paths of
the immigrants on the host labour market cannot be derived analytically. For example, the average
number of unemployment spells and the average length of each unemployment spell are impossible
to deduce directly from the transition probability or from the estimated parameters. In this section
we provide these, and many more, indicators on the basis of simulations. These simulations use the
estimated parameters of the multi-state multiple spell competing risks model and the observed entry
into the The Netherlands as input.
First we simulate a base scenario. This base scenario is based on a synthetic cohort of labour
migrants, all entering at the same time. The synthetic cohort consists of 50000 migrants, for which
the distribution of the start population of migrants equals the observed entry distribution. For each
simulation round we draw a vector of parameter estimates assuming that the estimated coefficients
are normally distributed around the point estimates with a variance-covariance matrix equal to the
estimated one. Then, on a monthly basis, we simulate the transitions for each member of the synthetic
cohort using the implied transition intensities. If the simulated migrant becomes unemployed we use
the transition intensity from unemployment, and similar for a non-participating migrant and a migrant
abroad. We use the evolution of the labour-migration path, the history of all occurrences of labour
market and migration states, of each individual member in the (dynamic) simulation. Thus, if a
(simulated) migrant enters the Dutch labour market again we take the effect of repeated entry (and
possible labour market experience) into account. We simulate the labour-migration path for ten years
and in the end we save the whole simulated migrant history. We repeat the simulations 100 times.
Put Table 9 about here
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Table 9 reports the obtained indicators of this base scenario. A labour migrant, ten years after
arrival, has spent more than half of this time employed and three and a half a month unemployed.
The migrant has more than two employment spells each lasting almost 3 years. Unemployment spells
last on average six months, non-participation spells last almost a year and the periods abroad almost
four years. If a migrant has been unemployed at least once it has on average almost two spells. Thus,
previous unemployment almost doubles the chance to become unemployed. A previous period without
income in The Netherlands more than doubles the chance to experience it again. Emigration experience
also increases the migration dynamics. Thus, for each of these transitions earlier experiences increase
the chance of reoccurrence.
The situation ten years after entry could also be derived from the transition probability. The
simulations provide the situation for the observed characteristics distribution of the immigrants, which
could be obtained from the transition probability by integrating out this distribution. Ten years after
entry 50% of the migrants are ‘still’ employed, 4% are unemployed, 13% are non-participating and
32% are abroad. Looking at these numbers unemployment of migrants only seems a minor issue.
However, only 17% of the migrants remain employed for the whole ten years. Within ten years 30%
of the migrants ever become unemployed. Some of these unemployment spells are rather short. Still,
16% of the migrants experiences an unemployment spell longer than six months, 9% experiences an
unemployment spell longer than one year and 5% experiences an unemployment spell longer than two
years.
The labour migrants spend a considerable amount of time in the country without income. More
than 23 of the migrants ever experiences such a period of non-participation. These periods of no-income
can be rather long as more than 50% of the migrants has such periods for longer than six months. A
quarter of the migrants has no-income periods of more than two years. The majority of migrants that
leave the country remain abroad. More than 40% ever leaves and 37% stays abroad for more than one
year.
Put Table 11, Table 12 and Figure 8 about here
Another way to analyse the labour market dynamics of the migrants is to look at the most com-
mon paths of the migrants on the labour market. The first column of Table 11 present the frequency
distribution of the paths of the simulated migrants. The first column of Table 12 presents the average
duration spent in each state for the eleven most common paths. The five most common paths are
depicted in the left-upper corner of Figure 8. The most common path (17%) of the labour migrants
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is that they remain employed for the whole ten years. Around 8% of the migrants interrupt their
employment with 112 year without income. Another 8% leaves the country after, on average, 3 years
in the country. Many of the labour market paths of the migrants involve some period without in-
come, after which the migrants either return to work or leave the country. The reason why so many
migrants go through the non-participation state is that most migrants are not (yet) eligible for unem-
ployment benefits. Why they stay in the country without income is unclear. They might have enough
wealth to survive a period without income. Or, they might have relatives in the country who support
them. A final reason to remain in the country without income is that they have income from abroad.
Unfortunately, the data do not provide us information to distinguish among these causes.
Simulations can also provide scenario analyses. We consider three alternative scenario’s. From a policy
perspective it is very important to know what would happen with the labour market dynamics of new
immigrants when the unemployment rate increases rapidly, as is currently encountered due to the
Credit Crunch. In our first scenario (UNEMPLOYMENT) we simulate the effect of an increase from
the current average unemployment rate in The Netherlands of 3.1% to 6% on the labour market and
migration dynamics of new immigrants. The second scenario (NEW EU) looks at the recent huge, but
only partly captured by the data, inflow of immigrants from the EU accession countries, the countries
that joint the EU in 2004. From 2002 to 2007 their number quadrupled. The third scenario (HIGH
INCOME) considers the effect of a recent policy to moderate the immigration of immigrants with a
high income. We assume that this leads to a 50% increase in the inflow of high income immigrants and
simulate the impact of this increase on the labour market and migration dynamics of all immigrants.
For the unemployment scenario we use, just as in the base scenario, the entry distribution to
construct this cohort. For the new EU and the high income scenario we adjust the entry distribution.
For the new EU scenario the number of immigrants form the EU accession countries is quadrupled
and for the high income scenario the number of immigrants with an income above e 5000 per month is
increased by 50%. Table 10 to Table 12 report the result of these simulations. In Figure 7 to Figure 8
the transition probabilities of each of the scenario’s are reported.
Put Table 10 and Figure 7 about here
It is not surprising that the time migrants spent in unemployment increases when the unemploy-
ment rate in The Netherlands increases. However, the probability that a migrant experiences at least
one unemployment spell does not increase. The probability on repeated unemployment even decreases
significantly. When the national unemployment rate would increase the average length of the unem-
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ployment spell of migrants increases with more than 60%. It also induces more migrants to leave the
country, but they also return from abroad more often. The probability to become non-participating
in the country declines and the average duration of such a period without income increases. Although
the time spent employed and the probability to be employed ten years after entry both decrease
the fraction of migrants that remains employed for the whole ten year period increases. Thus, the
deterioration of the labour market induces the unsuccessful migrants to search for other jobs abroad.
When the inflow of migrants from the EU accession countries, especially Poland, quadruples, the
time spent in employment increases and the time spent in unemployment decreases. This also leads
to more, but shorter, employment spells and periods abroad. This is in line with the large number
of seasonal workers from these countries. Unemployment spells become less frequent and shorter.
This leads to a substantial decline in the percentage of migrants that ever get unemployed. We can
therefore conclude that we expect that those migrants will fare relatively well on the Dutch labour
market.
When the policy of attracting more high income migrants to The Netherlands is really successful,
the long run effects on the labour market are small. Although the time in unemployment and non-
participation of migrants decreases, the time in employment will also decrease. More migrants leave
the country and they will stay abroad longer. Many high income migrants are expatriates who have
a temporary contract. Those migrants perceive their stay in The Netherlands as a temporary phase
in their career.
7 Conclusion
Most previous studies have focused primarily on earnings, with little attention on the issue of labour
market status. The importance of repeat and circular migration is also largely overlooked. In this
paper a coherent modeling approach is developed to model the interrelation of labour market transi-
tions and out- and repeat migration of immigrants. To this end we estimate a multi-state multiple
spell competing risks model and identify four states: employed, unemployed receiving benefits, non-
participating (out-of-the-labour market, and no benefits) and abroad. The first three states indicate
the labour market status of the immigrant in the host country.
For the analysis we use data on recent labour immigrants to The Netherlands, which implies that
all migrants are (self)-employed at the time of arrival. The data further contain information on the
timing of migration moves, timing of labour status, income change and employment sector. We also
have demographic information, such as the country of origin and marital status. We show that many
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migrants leave the country after a period without income.
We show that personal characteristics (gender and marital status), employment characteristics
(self-employment, income and sector) and country of origin play an important role in explaining the
labour market dynamics of the migrants. A migrant who has gained knowledge about the Dutch
labour market through multiple entry has a higher probability to remain employed. Both low and
high income migrants have a lower probability to remain employed. The low income migrants also
become non-participating relatively often. High income migrants also leave the country fast. However,
they do not enter non-participation more often.
To obtain more insight in the labour market and migration paths of the labour migrants, that
cannot be derived analytically, we simulated the dynamic behaviour of a synthetic cohort of 50,000
of these migrants. First, we simulated the paths of the current inflow of migrants, the base scenario,
by using the observed entry distribution as start population. From this microsimulation we reveal
that although after ten years only a small percentage of the migrants is unemployed, almost one-third
experiences an unemployment spell within ten years of arrival. Thus, at first sight it seems that only
a very limited number of the labour migrants draw on the Dutch social security system, while the
results from microsimulation indicate that 9% of the migrants have unemployment spells of more than
one year.
Microsimulation also provides a framework to conduct scenario analysis. We considered three alter-
native scenario’s. Our first scenario tried to mimic the foreseen increase in the national unemployment
rate due to the current Credit Crunch. Not surprisingly, an increase in the national unemployment
rate increases the unemployment rate of the migrants. However, this is mainly caused by longer un-
employment spells of those who get unemployed, and hardly by an increase in the number of migrants
that ever become unemployed. It also induces more migrants to leave. But, it also leads to more
migrants that remain employed.
The second scenario mimics the recent acceleration of the inflow of migrants from the countries that
joined the EU in 2004. A quadrupling of those migrants leads to better labour market perspectives for
the migrants (on average). Migrants from these countries are often seasonal workers, which is reflected
in their more frequent, but shorter, employment spells. The third scenario assumes that the recent
entry simplification of high income migrants would lead to an increase of the inflow of these migrants
by 50%. This will not have a lasting impact as many of these high income migrants leave the country
fast.
Very often a period without income proceeds the departure from the country. It seems odd that
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so many migrants stay, for relatively long periods, in The Netherlands without income. The reason
is that many of these recent migrants are not (yet) eligible for unemployment benefits. But the
question is how these migrants can survive without income. Three possible explanations are that (i)
those migrants have enough wealth to survive a period without income, (ii) they have relatives in the
country who support them, or (iii) they have income from abroad. Unfortunately, the data do not
provide us information to distinguish among these causes. An avenue for further research is therefore
to investigate this in more detail.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (sample mean at arrival)
immigrants total workforce (2000)
average age 32 38
aged 18-25 19%
aged 50-55 3%
aged 55-60 1%
female 29% 41%
married 24% 60%
Divorced 2% 8%
single, no kids 47% 20%
Children at home 15% 49%
Social Economic variables
Av. monthly income e 3003
Income < 1000 19% 7%
Income 1000 - 2000 32%
Income 2000 - 3000 19%
Income 3000 - 4000 8%
Income 4000 - 5000 4%
Income > 5000 15% 22%
Working in industry 11% 14%
Working in trade 14% 17%
Working for temporary offices 14% 3%
Working in services 24% 16%
Working in education 7% 6%
Working in catering 6% 4%
Working in transportation 6% 7%
Country of origin
Belgium 5% -
Germany 10% -
UK 18% -
France 6% -
rest EU15/EFTA 23% -
new EU 5% -
North-America 6% -
Japan 3% -
Australasia/Asia 13% -
Africa 5% -
Turkey 2% -
Morocco 1% -
# observations 54832 7,2 mln
Source: Statistics Netherlands, based on own calculations.
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Table 2: Spell dynamics of the labour migrants (# 45,987)
Percentage ending in
# of spells employed UI NP Abroad
Employed 73375 43% 6% 39% 12%
Unemployed (UI) 8735 46% 22% 28% 4%
Non-participation (NP) 31873 44% 12% 20% 25%
Abroad 22153 10% 1% 4% 86%
Source: Statistics Netherlands, based on own calculations.
Table 3: Included variables in the models
demographics gender, married, cohabiting, divorced, widowed, single par-
ent, Youngest child < 4, Youngest child 5-12, Youngest child
13-18, 8 age (at entry) intervals
Country of origin Belgium, Germany, UK, France, new-EU (2004) countries,
Former Yugoslavia, rest of Europe (non EU- or EFTA-
countries), Morocco, rest of Africa, Turkey, Iran, Japan, In-
donesia, China, rest of Asia, Surinam, rest of Latin America,
USA/Canada, Australia
Income groups (except from
no-income)
income < e 1000 p.m., income e 1000 - e 2000 p.m. income
e 3000 - e 4000 p.m., income e 4000 - e 5000 p.m. income
> e 5000 p.m. (except from unemployment)
Employment sector (only if
origin state is employment)
Agriculture, industry, construction, catering, transporta-
tion, finance, temporary services, cleaning, services, civil
services, education, health care, culture
Self-employed only from employment
History previous immigration, previous emigration (only from
abroad), previous employment (from employment), previous
unemployment (from unemployment and no-income), previ-
ous no income (from unemployment and non-participation),
left the country from no income (from abroad), left the coun-
try from unemployment (from abroad)
Business cycle indicators Unemployment rate at entry, Unemployment rate
29
Table 4: Marginal effect on exit probability from EMPLOYMENT
unemployment non-participation abroad
female 0.026∗∗∗ −0.011∗ −0.014∗∗∗
(0.004 ) (0.005) (0.004 )
Married 0.046∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗
(0.006 ) (0.007 ) (0.004 )
Aged 18-25 −0.008∗ 0.014∗ −0.006
(0.004) (0.006 ) (0.005 )
Aged 55-60 0.065∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗ −0.009
(0.017) (0.020 ) (0.013 )
Youngest child < 4 0.019∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.005 ) (0.008 ) (0.007 )
Youngest child 5-12 0.013 −0.058∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.007 ) (0.011 ) (0.009 )
self-employed 0.035∗∗ −0.004 −0.031∗
(0.012 ) (0.018 ) (0.016)
income < 1000 0.024∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗
(0.005 ) (0.009 ) (0.007 )
income 1000-2000 0.023∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗
(0.004 ) (0.006 ) (0.005 )
income 3000-4000 −0.024∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.005 ) (0.008 ) (0.007 )
income 4000-5000 −0.035∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.006 ) (0.011 ) (0.010 )
income > 5000 −0.053∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(0.006 ) (0.010 ) (0.009 )
Industry −0.009 −0.129∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(0.005 ) (0.010 ) (0.009 )
Catering −0.030∗∗∗ −0.029∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.006 ) (0.012 ) (0.011 )
Transportation −0.002 −0.050∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.006 ) (0.010 ) (0.009 )
Finance −0.013 −0.039∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.010 ) (0.015 ) (0.012 )
Services −0.005 −0.057∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.005 ) (0.007 ) (0.006 )
Education 0.093∗∗∗ −0.219∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.011 ) (0.014 ) (0.013 )
Africa 0.018∗∗ 0.016 −0.034∗∗∗
(0.007 ) (0.009 ) (0.007 )
Japan −0.060∗∗∗ −0.407∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗
(0.009 ) (0.022 ) (0.023 )
USA/Canada −0.039∗∗∗ 0.020∗ 0.019∗
(0.006 ) (0.010 ) (0.008 )
new-EU countries −0.025∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.006 ) (0.012 ) (0.011 )
Belgium 0.077∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.011 ) (0.013 ) (0.009 )
Germany 0.037∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.006 ) (0.008 ) (0.006 )
UK −0.001 0.030∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗
(0.004 ) (0.006 ) (0.005 )
Repeated entry −0.060∗∗∗ −0.608∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗
(0.006 ) (0.011 ) (0.011 )
Repeated employment 0.028∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.004 ) (0.006 ) (0.006 )
Unemployment rate at entry −0.001 −0.020∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.002 ) (0.004 ) (0.003 )
Unemployment rate 0.010∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.002 ) (0.003 ) (0.003 )
Reference individual: Unemployment 8.5%, NP 76.4%, abroad 15.1%. Only if
one of the 3 marginal effects is significant they are shown. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
and ∗∗∗p < 0.001 30
Table 5: Marginal effect on exit probability from UNEMPLOYMENT
employment non-participation abroad
female −0.044∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.012 ) (0.011 ) (0.005 )
Married 0.023 −0.001 −0.022∗∗∗
(0.013 ) (0.013 ) (0.006 )
Divorced 0.045∗ −0.025 −0.020∗
(0.021 ) (0.020 ) (0.008 )
Widowed −0.388∗ 0.340∗ 0.047
(0.164 ) (0.161 ) (0.027 )
Aged 18-25 0.042∗∗ −0.039∗∗ −0.003
(0.016 ) (0.015 ) (0.006 )
Aged 55-60 −0.128∗ 0.136∗ −0.008
(0.056 ) (0.054 ) (0.015 )
income < 1000 -0.018 0.003 0.015∗
(0.016 ) (0.015 ) (0.008 )
Morocco −0.091∗ 0.116∗∗ −0.025
(0.043 ) (0.042 ) (0.015 )
China −0.143 0.018 0.125∗
(0.084 ) (0.080 ) (0.049 )
other Asia −0.071∗ 0.034 0.037∗
(0.035 ) (0.032 ) (0.017 )
UK −0.012 −0.004 0.016∗
(0.017 ) (0.015 ) (0.008 )
Repeated entry −0.130∗∗∗ −0.046∗ 0.175∗∗∗
(0.036 ) (0.020 ) (0.044 )
Repeated unemployment 0.098∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.012 ) (0.011 ) (0.006 )
Repeated no-income −0.464∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗
(0.028 ) (0.027 ) (0.007 )
Unemployment rate 0.022∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.008 ) (0.006 ) (0.007 )
Reference individual: Employment 72.6%, NP 24.2%, abroad 3.3%. Only if
one of the 3 marginal effects is significant they are shown. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
and ∗∗∗p < 0.001
31
Table 6: Marginal effect on exit probability from NON PARTICIPATION
employment unemployment abroad
female 0.010 0.019∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.004) (0.007 )
Married 0.020∗ 0.017∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.005) (0.008 )
Cohabiting 0.163∗ −0.015 −0.148∗
(0.069) (0.031) (0.065 )
Divorced 0.102∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.010) (0.016 )
Aged 18-25 0.061∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.005) (0.009 )
Aged 45-50 −0.041∗ 0.016 0.024
(0.016) (0.009) (0.015 )
Aged 50-55 −0.081∗∗∗ 0.012 0.069∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.011) (0.020 )
Aged 55-60 −0.102∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.040
(0.031) (0.018) (0.030 )
Africa 0.037∗∗ −0.001 −0.035∗∗
(0.013) (0.007) (0.012 )
Turkey −0.063∗∗ −0.018 0.081∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.010) (0.021 )
Japan −0.240∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.009) (0.030 )
China −0.161∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.015) (0.035 )
Indonesia 0.037 0.054∗ −0.091∗∗
(0.033) (0.021) (0.030 )
other Asia −0.164∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.008) (0.015 )
USA/Canada −0.242∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.007) (0.013 )
Former Yugoslavia −0.107∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.039
(0.042) (0.026) (0.042 )
new-EU countries 0.082∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.007) (0.014 )
Other Europe −0.071∗∗∗ −0.005 0.076∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.009) (0.018 )
Germany 0.001 0.015∗ −0.016
(0.011) (0.006) (0.011 )
UK −0.056∗∗∗ −0.012∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.005) (0.008 )
France −0.106∗∗∗ 0.004 0.102∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.008) (0.013 )
Repeated entry −0.071∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.003) (0.015 )
Repeated unemployment −0.279∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗ −0.286∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.017 ) (0.012 )
Repeated no-income 0.035∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.007
(0.014) (0.007) (0.013 )
Unemployment rate −0.020∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003 )
Reference individual: Employment 47.4%, Unemployment 10.1%, abroad
42.6%. Only if one of the 3 marginal effects is significant they are shown.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01 and ∗∗∗p < 0.001
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Table 7: Marginal effect on exit probability from ABROAD
employment unemployment non-participation
female −0.091∗∗∗ 0.008 0.083∗∗∗
(0.020 ) (0.014) (0.020)
Married −0.109∗∗∗ −0.016 0.125∗∗∗
(0.031 ) (0.019) (0.030)
Divorced −0.239∗∗∗ −0.004 0.243∗∗∗
(0.069 ) (0.015) (0.066)
Aged 35-40 0.072∗ −0.033 −0.039
(0.030 ) (0.022) (0.026)
Aged 40-45 0.083∗ −0.020 −0.063∗
(0.035 ) (0.025) (0.028)
income < 1000 0.014 −0.059∗ 0.045
(0.051 ) (0.024 ) (0.048)
income 1000-2000 0.037 −0.049∗ 0.012
(0.046 ) (0.023 ) (0.044)
income 3000-4000 0.101∗ −0.021 −0.080
(0.052 ) (0.024 ) (0.047)
income > 5000 0.097∗ −0.020 −0.077
(0.048 ) (0.024 ) (0.045)
Morocco −0.246∗ 0.083 0.162
(0.103 ) (0.114 ) (0.102 )
Turkey −0.052 0.079∗ −0.027
(0.087 ) (0.040 ) (0.087 )
Japan −0.097 0.110∗∗ −0.013
(0.059 ) (0.037 ) (0.057 )
Iran −0.243 0.340∗ −0.097
(0.152 ) (0.157 ) (0.116 )
China −0.204 0.353∗∗∗ −0.149∗
(0.106 ) (0.106 ) (0.072 )
USA/Canada 0.093∗ −0.003 −0.090∗
(0.042 ) (0.033 ) (0.036 )
new-EU countries 0.214∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗ −0.148∗∗∗
(0.030 ) (0.025 ) (0.023 )
Germany 0.026 0.022 −0.048∗
(0.029 ) (0.024 ) (0.024 )
Repeated departure 0.079∗ −0.037∗ −0.042
(0.040 ) (0.019) (0.041 )
no income in NL −0.147∗∗∗ 0.068 0.080∗
(0.037 ) (0.043) (0.039 )
unemployed in NL −0.374∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.089
(0.031 ) (0.069) (0.054 )
Unemployment rate at entry 0.029∗ −0.003 −0.026∗
(0.014 ) (0.009) (0.013)
Unemployment rate 0.117∗∗∗ 0.020 −0.137∗∗∗
(0.015 ) (0.011) (0.013)
Reference individual: Employment 63.0%, Unemployment 8.5%, NP 28.4%. Only if
one of the 3 marginal effects is significant they are shown. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01 and
∗∗∗p < 0.001
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Table 8: Marginal effect on transition probability, 5 years after entry
employment unemployment non-participation abroad
female 0.003 0.005∗ 0.003 −0.011∗
(0.008 ) (0.002) (0.006 ) ( 0.005)
Married 0.075∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.031∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗
(0.008 ) (0.002) (0.005 ) (0.005 )
Cohabiting 0.069∗ −0.002 −0.002 −0.066∗∗
(0.028 ) (0.004) (0.023 ) (0.022 )
Divorced 0.093∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.030∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗
(0.011 ) (0.003) (0.007 ) (0.007 )
Aged 18-25 −0.005 −0.003 0.016∗∗ −0.008
(0.008 ) (0.002) (0.005 ) (0.006 )
Aged 50-55 −0.031∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.006 0.011
(0.015 ) (0.004) (0.009 ) (0.010 )
Aged 55-60 −0.096∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.003 0.038∗∗
(0.021 ) (0.012) (0.011 ) (0.013 )
Youngest child < 4 0.013 0.002 −0.018∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.008 ) (0.002) (0.005 ) (0.006 )
Youngest child 5-12 0.042∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.036∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.010 ) (0.002) (0.005 ) (0.007 )
Youngest child 13-18 0.033∗∗ −0.002 −0.018∗ −0.012
(0.012 ) (0.002) (0.008 ) (0.011 )
self-employed 0.152∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗
(0.009 ) (0.002 ) (0.005) (0.006)
income < 1000 −0.237∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.011 ) (0.006 ) (0.008) (0.010)
income 1000-2000 −0.074∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.013∗
(0.008 ) (0.002 ) (0.005) (0.006)
income 3000-4000 −0.047∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ 0.002 0.051∗∗∗
(0.011 ) (0.002 ) (0.005) (0.008)
income 4000-5000 −0.082∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.003 0.093∗∗∗
(0.010 ) (0.002 ) (0.006) (0.009)
income > 5000 −0.169∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ 0.009 0.166∗∗∗
(0.010 ) (0.002 ) (0.006) (0.008)
Agriculture −0.238∗∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.019 ) (0.002) (0.008) (0.019)
Industry −0.095∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.007 0.101∗∗∗
(0.009 ) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007)
Construction −0.154∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.016 ) (0.003) (0.007) (0.015)
Cleaning −0.141∗∗∗ 0.004 0.024∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.014 ) (0.002) (0.006) (0.012)
Catering −0.188∗∗∗ 0.004 0.037∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(0.011 ) (0.002) (0.006) (0.011)
Transportation −0.091∗∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.013∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.009 ) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008)
Finance −0.052∗∗∗ −0.001 0.005 0.048∗∗∗
(0.010 ) (0.002) (0.006) (0.008)
Temporary services −0.333∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗
(0.010 ) (0.003) (0.007) (0.010)
Services −0.119∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.010 ) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008)
Education −0.006 0.007∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.009 ) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008)
Health Care −0.014 −0.002 −0.019∗∗ 0.035∗∗
(0.013 ) (0.002) (0.006) (0.011)
Only if one of the 4 marginal effects is significant they are shown. ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗
p < 0.01 and ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001. Reference individual after 5 years: employment 74.8%;
unemployment 1.2%; NP 10.5%; abroad 13.5%.
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Table 8: Marginal effect on transition probability, 5 years after entry (continued)
employment unemployment non-participation abroad
Turkey −0.106∗∗∗ 0.004 0.045∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.017 ) (0.003 ) (0.009) (0.014 )
Japan −0.037∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.012 ) (0.002 ) (0.006) (0.012 )
other Asia −0.049∗∗∗ −0.002 0.024∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗
(0.012 ) (0.002 ) (0.007) (0.010 )
USA/Canada −0.137∗∗∗ −0.005∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.013 ) (0.002 ) (0.008) (0.010 )
Morocco 0.010 0.019∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.033∗
(0.020 ) (0.005 ) (0.011) (0.015 )
Africa 0.055∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.009 −0.045∗∗∗
(0.009 ) (0.002 ) (0.006) (0.007 )
Former Yugoslavia 0.058∗∗ 0.002 −0.013 −0.047∗∗
(0.022 ) (0.005 ) (0.012) (0.015 )
new-EU countries 0.065∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.010 ) (0.001 ) (0.006) (0.007 )
Other Europe 0.050∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗ 0.005 −0.050∗∗∗
(0.012 ) (0.002 ) (0.007) (0.009 )
Belgium 0.066∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.041∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.009 ) (0.002 ) (0.005) (0.007 )
Germany 0.031∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.017∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗
(0.009 ) (0.002 ) (0.005) (0.007 )
UK −0.012 0.000 0.021∗∗∗ −0.009
(0.009 ) (0.002 ) (0.005) (0.007 )
France −0.030∗∗ 0.000 0.016∗∗ 0.014
(0.011) (0.002) (0.006) (0.009)
Unemployment rate −0.017∗ 0.006∗∗ −0.003 0.014∗∗
(0.007) (0.002) (0.005) ( 0.005 )
Only if one of the 4 marginal effects is significant they are shown. ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
and ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001. Reference individual after 5 years: employment 74.8%; unemployment
1.2%; NP 10.5%; abroad 13.5%.
Table 9: Frequency- and time-indicators of base Scenario
employed unemployed non-participation abroad
Time spent in state (mos) 76.2 3.6 17.2 22.8
Av. # spells 2.30 0.57 1.55 0.49
Av. # spells (cond) 2.30 1.87 2.25 1.19
Av. spell length (mos) 33.4 6.3 11.1 45.7
Probability (%)
after 10 yrs 50.5 4.1 13.2 32.2
within 10 yrs 100 30.3 68.9 41.4
≥ 6 mos 98.0 15.9 53.6 39.0
≥ 1 yr 95.4 9.3 42.8 36.7
≥ 2 yrs 88.9 4.7 27.6 32.8
≥ 5 yrs 65.5 0.6 7.0 18.7
10 yrs 16.9
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Table 10: Change in frequency- and time-indicators for alternative Scenario’s
(difference with base scenario)
employed unemployed non-participation abroad
Unemployment scenario
Time spent in state (mos) −5.9∗ 2.1∗ −6.2∗ 10.0∗
Av. # spells −0.30∗ −0.01 −0.80∗ 0.31∗
Av. # spells (cond) −0.13∗ −0.50∗ 0.49∗
Av. spell length (mos) 2.1 3.9∗ 3.6∗ −10.0∗
Probability (%-point)
after 10 yrs −4.8∗ 2.6∗ −5.6∗ 7.9∗
within 10 yrs 1.6 −26.1∗ 12.7∗
≥ 6 mos −1.1∗ 4.8∗ −21.4∗ 12.5∗
≥ 1 yr −2.1∗ 5.0∗ −17.8∗ 12.4∗
≥ 2 yrs −4.2∗ 4.3∗ −8.9∗ 11.8∗
≥ 5 yrs −8.1∗ 1.1∗ −2.3∗ 9.4∗
10 yrs 3.4∗
New EU scenario
Time spent in state (mos) 3.6∗ −1.0∗ −1.8∗ −0.8∗
Av. # spells 0.20∗ −0.13∗ −0.03 0.10∗
Av. # spells (cond) −0.18∗ 0.00 0.21∗
Av. spell length (mos) −1.3∗ −0.4∗ −1.0∗ −9.1∗
Probability (%-point)
after 10 yrs 5.0∗ −1.3∗ −1.5∗ −2.3∗
within 10 yrs −4.6∗ −1.6∗ 1.2∗
≥ 6 mos 0.7∗ −3.9∗ −3.7∗ 0.5
≥ 1 yr 1.3∗ −2.7∗ −4.0∗ 0.2
≥ 2 yrs 2.5∗ −1.5∗ −3.0∗ −0.3
≥ 5 yrs 4.6∗ −0.2∗ −1.3∗ −1.4∗
10 yrs 0.0
high income scenario
Time spent in state (mos) −2.5∗ −0.9∗ −1.1∗ 4.5∗
Av. # spells −0.09∗ −0.10∗ −0.14∗ 0.07∗
Av. # spells (cond) −0.08∗ −0.10∗ 0.02
Av. spell length (mos) 0.3∗ −0.5∗ 0.3∗ 2.6∗
Probability (%-point)
after 10 yrs −3.6∗ −1.1∗ −1.0∗ 5.7∗
within 10 yrs −4.2∗ −3.2∗ 4.9∗
≥ 6 mos −0.5∗ −3.5∗ −3.2∗ 5.1∗
≥ 1 yr −1.2∗ −2.2∗ −2.7∗ 5.2∗
≥ 2 yrs −2.3∗ −1.2∗ −1.8∗ 5.0∗
≥ 5 yrs −3.1∗ −0.2∗ −0.5∗ 4.5∗
10 yrs −0.2
∗p < 0.05
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Table 11: Most frequent paths for all scenario’s
Percentage of paths
path base unemployment new EU high income
1 16.9 20.3∗ 16.9 16.7
131 7.8 2.7∗ 8.7∗ 7.5∗
14 7.7 13.9∗ 6.8∗ 10.7∗
134 5.7 1.9∗ 3.4∗ 5.5
1314 4.2 2.6∗ 4.6∗ 5.7∗
13 3.3 4.0∗ 2.8∗ 3.3
13131 3.1 0.4∗ 3.9∗ 2.9
1313 2.4 0.9∗ 2.1∗ 2.4
13134 2.3 0.3∗ 1.6∗ 2.2
1341 1.5 0.7∗ 1.4 1.3∗
141 1.4 3.5∗ 2.1∗ 1.4
1414 1.3 5.0∗ 1.8∗ 1.8∗
13231 1.1 0.8 0.9∗ 1.3
131313 1.1 0.1∗ 1.2∗ 1.1
131314 1.1 0.3∗ 1.4∗ 1.5∗
121 1.0 1.1 0.8∗ 0.8∗
sum 61.8 57.9 60.5 65.6
Most frequent paths are ordered for base scenario. In path: 1=em-
ployment; 2= unemployment; 3 = non-participation; 4=abroad.
∗ differs significantly (95%) from base scenario.
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Table 12: Average duration (in months) in each state for the most frequent paths for all scenario’s
Average duration in each state
path state base unemployment new EU high income
1 employment 120 120 120 120
131 employment 57.7 53.4− 60.8+ 58.4
non-participation 17.2 22.7+ 14.4− 17.2
employment 45.1 44.0 44.8 44.4
14 employment 38.8 39.8 40.9+ 36.8−
abroad 81.2 80.2 79.1− 83.1+
134 employment 43.1 44.7 45.6+ 41.7
non-participation 16.9 24.0+ 16.0− 16.9
abroad 60.1 51.3− 58.4 61.3
1314 employment 27.2 27.2 31.9+ 28.0
non-participation 14.2 18.9+ 12.9− 13.8
employment 23.9 23.0 24.9 23.7
abroad 54.7 50.9− 50.2− 54.4
13 employment 94.8 88.4− 98.2+ 94.9
non-participation 25.2 31.6+ 21.8− 25.1
13131 employment 34.0 29.3− 36.2+ 35.3
non-participation 13.6 14.3 13.1 14.0
employment 28.0 24.1− 27.6 25.8−
non-participation 14.2 20.8+ 13.5 14.9
employment 30.3 31.6 29.6 30.0
1313 employment 42.5 36.6− 46.3+ 42.7
non-participation 23.8 28.1+ 20.7− 23.9
employment 31.4 27.8− 33.2 31.3
non-participation 22.3 27.5+ 19.8− 22.1
13134 employment 25.5 21.6− 26.3 25.7
non-participation 14.0 17.3 13.6 14.0
employment 19.9 19.4 21.7+ 19.4
non-participation 15.0 22.5+ 14.5 15.4
abroad 45.7 39.3− 43.8 45.4
1341 employment 30.9 32.8 33.3 29.3
non-participation 14.4 21.3+ 14.3 14.7
abroad 40.7 37.4 37.8− 43.7+
employment 33.9 28.5− 34.6 32.4
141 employment 32.9 38.9+ 36.8+ 32.3
abroad 50.6 52.1 44.7− 54.6+
employment 36.5 29.0− 38.5 33.2−
Most frequent paths are ordered for base scenario. In path: 1=employment; 2= unem-
ployment; 3 = non-participation; 4=abroad. + significantly (95%) longer; − significantly
(95%) shorter.
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Figure 4: Marginal effects with 95% confidence bands for the transition probability to EMPLOYMENT
(continued)
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Figure 5: Marginal effects with 95% confidence bands for the transition probability to UNEMPLOY-
MENT
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Figure 5: Marginal effects with 95% confidence bands for the transition probability to UNEMPLOY-
MENT (continued)
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Figure 6: Marginal effects with 95% confidence bands for the transition probability to ABROAD
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Figure 6: Marginal effects with 95% confidence bands for the transition probability to ABROAD
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Figure 7: Transition probabilities in scenario’s (left) and change in transition probabilities w.r.t. base
scenario (right)
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Figure 8: Most frequent paths in scenario’s
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